CVE-2026-100666

Published: Set 26, 2026 Last Modified: Set 28, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
MEDIUM 6,9
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Confidentiality: N/A
Integrity: N/A
Availability: N/A
HIGH 7,3
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: low
Integrity: low
Availability: low

Description

AI Translation Available

Netty's HttpServerCodec (io.netty:netty-codec-http) in versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.16.Final and in versions up to and including 4.1.136.Final pairs each outbound response with an inbound request by calling pollMethod() once per response, including for 1xx informational responses. If a client pipelines an HTTP/1.1 GET carrying an Expect: 100-continue header followed by a HEAD request, the 100 Continue response consumes the queued GET method, so the subsequent 200 OK for the GET is paired with HEAD and its body is dropped, while the following 200 OK for the HEAD request is written with a body. This desynchronizes HTTP parsing on the connection: the GET entity is never delivered and the HEAD response body is interpreted as the GET body, resulting in response splitting and unsafe connection reuse. Fixed in 4.2.17.Final and 4.1.137.Final.

444

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Integrity Non-Repudiation Access Control
Potential Impacts:
Unexpected State Hide Activities Bypass Protection Mechanism
Applicable Platforms
Technologies: Web Based, Web Server
View CWE Details
https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-2g6j-r8q9-5hr8
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/netty-4.2.0-through-4.2.17-response-desync…