CVE-2026-100708

Published: Set 26, 2026 Last Modified: Set 28, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 7,1
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Confidentiality: N/A
Integrity: N/A
Availability: N/A
HIGH 7,1
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: low
Availability: none

Description

AI Translation Available

Froxlor before 2.3.13 returns the ssl_key_file column — which stores the raw PEM TLS private-key content — verbatim in the JSON responses of the Certificates.get and Certificates.listing API commands, because the results of the underlying domain_ssl_settings queries are passed through ApiCommand::response() without any field stripping or allowlist. A low-privileged authenticated customer API caller can retrieve the private keys of their own domains' certificates, including Let's Encrypt keys that Froxlor generates server-side and stores root-only (0600) and to which the customer otherwise has no filesystem access; reseller and customers_see_all admin accounts can dump the private keys of other principals through the same sink. Disclosed keys enable domain impersonation, passive decryption of captured TLS traffic, and active machine-in-the-middle attacks.

200

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

Draft
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Confidentiality
Potential Impacts:
Read Application Data
Applicable Platforms
Technologies: Not Technology-Specific, Web Based, Mobile
View CWE Details
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-6q2v-jjq5-m2c8
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-6q2v-jjq5-m2c8
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/froxlor-before-2.3.13-private-key-disclosu…