CVE-2026-100710

Published: Set 26, 2026 Last Modified: Set 27, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
MEDIUM 6,9
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: high
User Interaction: none
Confidentiality: N/A
Integrity: N/A
Availability: N/A
MEDIUM 4,9
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: high
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: none
Availability: none

Description

AI Translation Available

Froxlor through 2.3.10 does not filter sensitive columns from API responses: Domains::get(), Domains::listing(), SubDomains::get(), and the admin branch of SubDomains::listing() perform a wildcard SELECT over the panel_domains table and return the row unmodified, including the panel_domains.dkim_privkey field. An authenticated, non-superadmin admin holding the delegated customers_see_all flag can therefore read the DKIM private signing keys of domains belonging to other tenants via Domains.get, Domains.listing, SubDomains.get, or SubDomains.listing, with a single listing call disclosing the key of every visible domain. The disclosed keys allow an attacker to sign email that passes DKIM verification and DMARC alignment for the affected domains. This is a follow-on to an incomplete fix that stripped password and data_2fa but not dkim_privkey. The issue is fixed in 2.3.12.

200

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

Draft
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Confidentiality
Potential Impacts:
Read Application Data
Applicable Platforms
Technologies: Not Technology-Specific, Web Based, Mobile
View CWE Details
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-79gx-h528-j9xf
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/froxlor-before-2.3.12-dkim-private-key-dis…