CVE-2026-105299

Published: Ott 20, 2026 Last Modified: Ott 20, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 8,7
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: high
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: changed
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: high
Availability: none

Description

AI Translation Available

Summary

Before version 0.9.0, the HTTP/1 upstream path in pingora-proxy passed the downstream request through upstream_request_filter and wrote it to the upstream without removing the client's Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in upstream_request_filter (for example, Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.

Impact

Specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go's net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. The reporter demonstrated access to an IP-restricted endpoint using X-Forwarded-For for IP validation on the origin. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.

Note that Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are sanitized before arriving at Pingora gateways.

Mitigation:

*

Upgrade to pingora 0.9.0 or later. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto, or a pseudo-header. This is controlled by PeerOptions::http_upstream_request_policy (HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy). Fix commits: https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded , https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee

*

Do not use HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy::preserve() if the origin relies on headers added by Pingora; it restores the old passthrough behavior.

*

If you cannot upgrade: in upstream_request_filter, remove the Connection header and every header it nominates before adding trusted headers.

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System)

Trend Analysis

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System)

Prevede la probabilità di sfruttamento basata su intelligence sulle minacce e sulle caratteristiche della vulnerabilità.

EPSS Score
0,0034
Percentile
0,3th
Updated

Single Data Point

Only one EPSS measurement is available for this CVE. Trend analysis requires multiple data points over time.

444

Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Integrity Non-Repudiation Access Control
Potential Impacts:
Unexpected State Hide Activities Bypass Protection Mechanism
Applicable Platforms
Technologies: Web Based, Web Server
View CWE Details
https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora