CVE-2026-108361

Published: Ott 12, 2026 Last Modified: Ott 12, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 7,2
Attack Vector: local
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Confidentiality: N/A
Integrity: N/A
Availability: N/A

Description

AI Translation Available

Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Before 0.9.1, an attacker with local access could modify workload code, data, and configuration at any time after successful connection establishment. Once Evidence was successfully appraised and the connection was established, there was a window of vulnerability from the establishment of the connection to the termination of the connection where an attacker could modify the state of the workload and platform at runtime on the TLS endpoint acting as the Attester. This vulnerability was possible because Privasys/ra-tls-clients performed attestation only once in the lifetime of the connection (at connection establishment time), and the verifying peer continued to believe that the state was the same as in the initial Evidence throughout, whereas it could be stale at some point in time. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.1.

367

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Integrity Other Non-Repudiation
Potential Impacts:
Alter Execution Logic Unexpected State Modify Application Data Modify Files Or Directories Modify Memory Other Hide Activities
Applicable Platforms
All platforms may be affected
View CWE Details
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/commit/076074873117ee5ff35a7c39e0295…
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/commit/5ccfd778132e17cb54bb1a9c7b89d…
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/commit/b9114d772a636ad3307957dde4bb8…
https://github.com/Privasys/ra-tls-clients/security/advisories/GHSA-gg8q-mfhh-w…