CVE-2026-115863

Published: Ott 23, 2026 Last Modified: Ott 23, 2026

ExploitDB:

Other exploit source:

Google Dorks:

HIGH 7,6

Source: [email protected]

Attack Vector: adjacent_network

Attack Complexity: low

Privileges Required: none

User Interaction: none

Scope: unchanged

Confidentiality: low

Integrity: low

Availability: high

Description

ConnMan through 2.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow via a DHCPv6 Reply message. This occurs in get_domains in gdhcp/client.c. It copies a fixed NS_MAXDNAME (1025) bytes from a DHCPv6 DOMAIN_LIST (option 24) value into a 1026-byte stack buffer dns_name regardless of the actual option length, then walks DNS labels with an unbounded 'c += jump + 1' loop. A crafted DHCPv6 REPLY with a DOMAIN_LIST option of >= 1025 non-zero bytes makes the label walk leave the buffer and read/write '.' past its end in attacker-chosen strides. An on-link attacker can trigger this without authentication via a forged Router Advertisement (O=1) and a forged DHCPv6 REPLY matching xid/CLIENTID with a long DOMAIN_LIST. The impact is unauthenticated on-link crash of connmand (runs as root). This was introduced in bb06c47.

121

Stack-based Buffer Overflow

Draft

Abstraction: Variant Structure: Simple

Common Consequences

Security Scopes Affected:

Availability Integrity Confidentiality Access Control Other

Potential Impacts:

Modify Memory Dos: Crash, Exit, Or Restart Dos: Resource Consumption (Cpu) Dos: Resource Consumption (Memory) Execute Unauthorized Code Or Commands Bypass Protection Mechanism Other