CVE-2026-18568

Published: Ago 03, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 03, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 7,5
Source: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: none
Integrity: high
Availability: none

Description

AI Translation Available

XML::Sig versions from 0.29 before 0.72 for Perl allow signature verification bypass because verify returns true when every signature was skipped before any cryptographic check.

verify in lib/XML/Sig.pm counts the `//dsig:Signature` elements into `$numsigs` and iterates over them, but two paths reach `next` before any digest or key check runs: a `SignedInfo/Reference/@URI` that resolves to no element while `$numsigs` is greater than 1, and, when `id_attr` is set, a reference that does not match the requested ID. The loop records nothing about what it checked, so when every signature takes one of those paths control reaches the unconditional `return 1` that ends verify. Two `Signature` elements whose Reference URI names an ID that no element carries is enough, as is one such element combined with `id_attr`.

Any caller that passes untrusted XML to verify can receive a true return for a document in which no digest and no signature value was checked; a `cert` or `cert_text` trust anchor does not change this, because no key check runs. Versions up to 0.28 use an XML::XPath based verify that has no such skip and are not affected.

347

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Draft
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Access Control Integrity Confidentiality
Potential Impacts:
Gain Privileges Or Assume Identity Modify Application Data Execute Unauthorized Code Or Commands
Applicable Platforms
All platforms may be affected
View CWE Details
https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-XML-Sig/commit/ef22cfed1ac0f29b316d17eb7…
https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/XML-Sig-0.72/changes
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40934