CVE-2026-19569

Published: Ott 09, 2026 Last Modified: Ott 09, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 8,8
Attack Vector: local
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Scope: changed
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: high
Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

dynamic_object_create() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c computed the backing allocation for a dynamically allocated kernel object as obj_size_get(otype) + size, and for thread stack elements as STACK_ELEMENT_DATA_SIZE(size) (a round-up plus fixed overhead), without checking either expression for unsigned wrap-around. A size close to SIZE_MAX makes the computed total wrap to a very small value, so the heap chunk handed out is a few bytes while the object descriptor is still tagged with the full requested type and registered in the kernel object table.

The size argument reaches that arithmetic directly from user mode. k_object_alloc_size() is declared __syscall in include/zephyr/sys/kobject.h, its verifier z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size() in kernel/userspace/userspace_handler.c is a bare pass-through, and z_object_alloc() only range-checks otype — nothing bounds size. The stack-element branch is additionally reachable through the k_thread_stack_alloc() syscall via kernel/dynamic.c. Because subsequent kernel-object validation checks only the object's type and initialization state, the undersized handle passes K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT()/K_SYSCALL_OBJ_NEVER_INIT(), and the matching init syscall (for example k_mutex_init(), k_sem_init(), or k_thread_create()) then writes a complete object over the truncated allocation.

An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore trigger a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write into the kernel resource-pool heap, of a size and content it substantially controls, corrupting sys_heap chunk metadata and adjacent kernel objects. Under CONFIG_GEN_PRIV_STACKS the thread-stack branch additionally stores an attacker-influenced wild pointer as a user thread's privileged stack base. The practical result is escape from the CONFIG_USERSPACE sandbox — kernel-level code execution or at minimum kernel memory corruption and system compromise.

Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE together with CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS (also selected by CONFIG_DYNAMIC_THREAD under userspace), and a calling thread with an assigned resource pool. The fix rejects both overflowing computations and frees the partially built descriptor.

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System)

Trend Analysis

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System)

Prevede la probabilità di sfruttamento basata su intelligence sulle minacce e sulle caratteristiche della vulnerabilità.

EPSS Score
0,0012
Percentile
0,0th
Updated

EPSS Score Trend (Last 3 Days)

190

Integer Overflow or Wraparound

Stable
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Availability Integrity Confidentiality Access Control Other
Potential Impacts:
Dos: Crash, Exit, Or Restart Dos: Resource Consumption (Memory) Dos: Instability Modify Memory Execute Unauthorized Code Or Commands Bypass Protection Mechanism Alter Execution Logic Dos: Resource Consumption (Cpu)
Applicable Platforms
Languages: Not Language-Specific, C
View CWE Details
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/85c1c4c21945d9b8fcef03216f1…
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-fg8c-9fhq…