CVE-2026-31773

Published: Mag 01, 2026 Last Modified: Mag 03, 2026

ExploitDB:

Other exploit source:

Google Dorks:

HIGH 8,8

Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

Attack Vector: adjacent_network

Attack Complexity: low

Privileges Required: none

User Interaction: none

Scope: unchanged

Confidentiality: high

Integrity: high

Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state

The legacy responder path in smp_random() currently labels the stored
STK as authenticated whenever pending_sec_level is BT_SECURITY_HIGH.
That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing
flow actually achieved.

For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH stays clear
and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local
side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when
storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result.

This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code,
which already treats JUST_WORKS/JUST_CFM as unauthenticated.