CVE-2026-41185

Published: Mag 28, 2026 Last Modified: Mag 28, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
MEDIUM 6,0
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Confidentiality: N/A
Integrity: N/A
Availability: N/A

Description

AI Translation Available

When Calico is configured with the Azure IPAM plugin, the Calico CNI binary mutates the incoming CNI configuration to attach subnet information before delegating to the IPAM plugin. After mutating, the Azure IPAM helper logs the entire unmarshaled configuration map (stdinData) at INFO level to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on every CNI ADD and DEL invocation — once per pod scheduled or terminated on the node. When the cluster is deployed using token-based Kubernetes authentication, this log entry contains the ServiceAccount token, client key, and certificate authority in plaintext. Any principal with read access to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on a node  can read these logs and extract the credentials, which grant cluster-wide Calico networking admin privileges.

532

Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Confidentiality
Potential Impacts:
Read Application Data
Applicable Platforms
All platforms may be affected
View CWE Details
https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12502
https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12526
https://github.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12527
https://www.tigera.io/security-bulletins/tta-2026-002/