CVE-2026-41495

Published: Mag 08, 2026 Last Modified: Mag 08, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
MEDIUM 5,3
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: low
Integrity: none
Availability: none

Description

AI Translation Available

n8n-MCP is an MCP server that provides AI assistants access to n8n node documentation, properties, and operations. Prior to version 2.47.11, when n8n-mcp runs in HTTP transport mode, incoming requests to the POST /mcp endpoint had their request metadata written to server logs regardless of the authentication outcome. In deployments where logs are collected, forwarded to external systems, or viewable outside the request trust boundary (shared log storage, SIEM pipelines, support/ops access), this can result in disclosure of: bearer tokens from the Authorization header, per-tenant API keys from the, x-n8n-key header in multi-tenant setups, JSON-RPC request payloads sent to the MCP endpoint. Access control itself was not bypassed — unauthenticated requests were correctly rejected with 401 Unauthorized — but sensitive values from those rejected requests could still be persisted in logs. This issue has been patched in version 2.47.11.

532

Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Confidentiality
Potential Impacts:
Read Application Data
Applicable Platforms
All platforms may be affected
View CWE Details
https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp/releases/tag/v2.47.11
https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-pfm2-2mhg-8wpx