CVE-2026-43472

Published: Mag 08, 2026 Last Modified: Mag 08, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling

There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a
CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that
case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy,
which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness]

> I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true.

Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness.
Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS
(and current->fs->users == 1).

We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and
flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace.
Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM).
We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's
destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and
current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts.

They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling
process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with
pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug.

There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including
the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one
is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as 'allocate a new
fs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place'. Sure, we could
go for something like 'if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might
end up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set,
force allocation of new fs_struct', but let's keep it simple - the cost
of copy_fs_struct() is trivial.

Another benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets
a freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That
seriously simplifies the analysis...

FWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42e21e74061b0ebbd859839f81acf10efad02a27
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c4b2243cb6c0755159bd567130d5e12e7b10d9f
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/845bf3c6963a52096d0d3866e4a92db77a0c03d8
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa9ebc084505fb26dd90f4d7a249045aad152043
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af8f4be3b68ac8caa41c8e5ead0eeaf5e85e42d0
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0d99f60538ddb4a62ccaac2168d8f448965f083
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3ffc8f13034af895531a02c30b1fe3a34b46432
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7963d6997fea86a6def242ac36198b86655f912