CVE-2026-45894

Published: Mag 27, 2026 Last Modified: Mag 27, 2026
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Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down PASID entry

The Intel VT-d Scalable Mode PASID table entry consists of 512 bits (64
bytes). When tearing down an entry, the current implementation zeros the
entire 64-byte structure immediately using multiple 64-bit writes.

Since the IOMMU hardware may fetch these 64 bytes using multiple
internal transactions (e.g., four 128-bit bursts), updating or zeroing
the entire entry while it is active (P=1) risks a 'torn' read. If a
hardware fetch occurs simultaneously with the CPU zeroing the entry, the
hardware could observe an inconsistent state, leading to unpredictable
behavior or spurious faults.

Follow the 'Guidance to Software for Invalidations' in the VT-d spec
(Section 6.5.3.3) by implementing the recommended ownership handshake:

1. Clear only the 'Present' (P) bit of the PASID entry.
2. Use a dma_wmb() to ensure the cleared bit is visible to hardware
before proceeding.
3. Execute the required invalidation sequence (PASID cache, IOTLB, and
Device-TLB flush) to ensure the hardware has released all cached
references.
4. Only after the flushes are complete, zero out the remaining fields
of the PASID entry.

Also, add a dma_wmb() in pasid_set_present() to ensure that all other
fields of the PASID entry are visible to the hardware before the Present
bit is set.

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75ed00055c059dedc47b5daaaa2f8a7a019138ff
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/821807c167b7b48a41b95b6607c6b9f97600f7d9
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/949d71666e9dd19f21e7b4b53a88cd2c5b902858
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a84d30e8d2bacd21782a6481158b7c9c552f4868