CVE-2026-48025

Published: Lug 28, 2026 Last Modified: Lug 28, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
MEDIUM 6,9
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Confidentiality: N/A
Integrity: N/A
Availability: N/A

Description

AI Translation Available

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.7, internal/pki/resolver.go:36-64 constructs a CAManager with the plaintext ed25519.PrivateKey after unwrapping via the master key; internal/pki/ca.go:13-16 stores it. Callers at internal/api/enroll.go:116, internal/api/updates.go:297, and internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:40 use the manager for one Sign() and drop the reference on function return — but the underlying slice contents are not wiped before release. The keystore package's contract (internal/keystore/keystore.go doc: 'Callers MUST zeroise the returned plaintext DEK as soon as it is no longer needed') is not met by the CAManager consumer. Decrypted CA private keys persist in process heap until Go's GC scavenges the underlying slice — minutes to hours under load, indefinitely on idle servers. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.7.

244

Improper Clearing of Heap Memory Before Release ('Heap Inspection')

Draft
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Confidentiality Other
Potential Impacts:
Read Memory Other
Applicable Platforms
Languages: Memory-Unsafe, C, C++
View CWE Details
https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/bca1d5914fbaf3517d3b86145a802c0…
https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.7
https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v