CVE-2026-52732

Published: Ago 18, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 18, 2026

ExploitDB:

Other exploit source:

Google Dorks:

MEDIUM 5,3

Source: [email protected]

Attack Vector: network

Attack Complexity: low

Privileges Required: none

User Interaction: none

Scope: unchanged

Confidentiality: none

Integrity: none

Availability: low

Description

AI Translation Available

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, one unauthenticated P2P peer can monopolize all 25 MAX_INBOUND_CONCURRENCY slots in Zebra's inbound mempool download and verification pipeline. In zebrad/src/components/mempool/downloads.rs, the bounded queue was shared globally without per-peer accounting, while peer identity was not carried through Gossip and FullQueue responses were mapped to Response::Nil instead of reaching overload disconnection handling. An attacker can advertise fake transaction identifiers and remain silent so each task holds a slot until TRANSACTION_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT, then periodically refill the queue as slots expire. While saturated, honest peer transactions and local sendrawtransaction requests are rejected with MempoolError::FullQueue, although block validation and synchronization continue. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.