CVE-2026-52734

Published: Ago 18, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 18, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
MEDIUM 5,3
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: none
Integrity: none
Availability: low

Description

AI Translation Available

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, an unauthenticated P2P peer can cause the mempool download pipeline to retain transactions after verification reaches the outer RATE_LIMIT_DELAY timeout. In zebrad/src/components/mempool/downloads.rs, Downloads::poll_next removed cancel_handles entries after success and ordinary verification errors, but tokio::time::error::Elapsed did not carry the UnminedTxId needed to remove the timed-out entry. Each retained cancel_handles entry could hold a full Gossip::Tx(UnminedTx), while normal mined-transaction cleanup could not match attacker transactions and no periodic garbage collection or count cap existed. Sustained traffic therefore caused monotonic memory growth until swap pressure degraded the node or the operating system terminated the zebrad process for exhausting memory. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

401

Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime

Draft
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Availability Other
Potential Impacts:
Dos: Crash, Exit, Or Restart Dos: Instability Dos: Resource Consumption (Cpu) Dos: Resource Consumption (Memory) Reduce Performance
Applicable Platforms
Languages: Not Language-Specific, C, C++
View CWE Details
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1440b43ca7df59aca948090d4511755…
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.5.0
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-65jj-fmw8-468q