CVE-2026-52736

Published: Ago 18, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 18, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 8,7
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Confidentiality: N/A
Integrity: N/A
Availability: N/A

Description

AI Translation Available

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a remote unauthenticated P2P peer can stall a Zebra node by racing an invalid block body against the valid canonical body for the same block header hash. ZIP-244 permits the attacker to mutate coinbase scriptSig authentication data while retaining the transaction identifiers, merkle root, and block header hash, so the poisoned body fails later commitment validation but shares the canonical hash. In zebra-state/src/service.rs, queue_and_commit_to_non_finalized_state recorded the hash in non_finalized_block_write_sent_hashes before contextual validation completed and did not remove it when the write task rejected the body. When the honest body later arrived, the cached hash caused KnownBlock::WriteChannel duplicate handling to suppress it, leaving the node stuck one height behind until restart or reorganization. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

459

Incomplete Cleanup

Draft
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Other Confidentiality Integrity
Potential Impacts:
Other Read Application Data Modify Application Data Dos: Resource Consumption (Other)
Applicable Platforms
All platforms may be affected
View CWE Details
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1440b43ca7df59aca948090d4511755…
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.5.0
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-4m69-67m6-prqp