CVE-2026-52739

Published: Ago 18, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 18, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
MEDIUM 5,9
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: high
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: none
Integrity: none
Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker's shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

248

Uncaught Exception

Draft
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Availability Confidentiality
Potential Impacts:
Dos: Crash, Exit, Or Restart Read Application Data
Applicable Platforms
Languages: C++, Java, C#
View CWE Details
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1440b43ca7df59aca948090d4511755…
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.5.0
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6