CVE-2026-57114

Published: Ott 23, 2026 Last Modified: Ott 23, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 7,2
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: changed
Confidentiality: low
Integrity: low
Availability: none

Description

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.

367

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Integrity Other Non-Repudiation
Potential Impacts:
Alter Execution Logic Unexpected State Modify Application Data Modify Files Or Directories Modify Memory Other Hide Activities
Applicable Platforms
All platforms may be affected
View CWE Details
918

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control
Potential Impacts:
Read Application Data Execute Unauthorized Code Or Commands Bypass Protection Mechanism
Applicable Platforms
Technologies: Web Based, AI/ML, Web Server
View CWE Details
https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-5…