CVE-2026-64259

Published: Lug 25, 2026 Last Modified: Lug 27, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 7,8
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Attack Vector: local
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: high
Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fuse-uring: make a fuse_req on SQE commit only findable after memcpy

Bad userspace might try to trick us and send commit SQEs request
unique / commit-id of requests that are not even send to
fuse-server (io_uring_cmd_done() not called) yet.

fuse_uring_commit_fetch() ends the fuse request when the ring entry
has a wrong state, but that could have caused a use-after-free
with the memcpy operations in fuse_uring_send_in_task().
In order to avoid such races the call of fuse_uring_add_to_pq()
is moved after the copy operations and just before completing
the io-uring request - malicious userspace cannot find the request
anymore until all prepration work in fuse-client/kernel is completed.

This also moves fuse_uring_add_to_pq() a bit up in the code to
avoid a forward declaration. Also not with a preparation commit,
to make it easier to back port to older kernels.

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1efd3d474fc0ba74dfd984249bca78807d739812
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a635f427d57e2012102ae4886b48d8955c59fb86
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1711479e9068ea31b31353a702a51e639c3d059