CVE-2026-64300

Published: Lug 25, 2026 Last Modified: Lug 27, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 7,8
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Attack Vector: local
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: high
Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf/aux: Fix page UAF in map_range()

map_range() reads rb->aux_pages[], rb->aux_nr_pages and rb->aux_pgoff via
perf_mmap_to_page() while holding only event->mmap_mutex. Those fields are
serialized by rb->aux_mutex, and mmap_mutex is per event.

Thus, two events sharing one rb via PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT can race
rb_alloc_aux() with map_range(), leading to a page-UAF scenario as follows:

CPU 0 CPU 1
===== =====
rb_alloc_aux() map_range()
[1]: allocate rb->aux_pages[0]
[2]: rb->aux_nr_pages++
[3]: perf_mmap_to_page()
returns rb->aux_pages[0]
[4]: map it as VM_PFNMAP
[5]: rb->aux_pgoff = 1

munmap the page
[6]: free rb->aux_pages[0]

Pages mapped as VM_PFNMAP have no refcount protection, so CPU 1 holds a
mapping to a freed physical frame.

Fix this by taking rb->aux_mutex across the page walk in map_range().

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0cff05bd2186020f8706233e261016d149cc24db
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5948aaf64f81f217a25dcc2bf6c0779bca19566c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8b7e113f7b61eef2f017e6329c27c2331058c5a