CVE-2026-66073

Published: Set 25, 2026 Last Modified: Set 25, 2026

ExploitDB:

Other exploit source:

Google Dorks:

MEDIUM 6,0

Source: [email protected]

Attack Vector: network

Attack Complexity: low

Privileges Required: low

User Interaction: none

Confidentiality: N/A

Integrity: N/A

Availability: N/A

Description

AI Translation Available

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 3.13.0 until 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6, Atom table exhaustion via management API node field. pUT /api/queues/:vhost/:name (and the exchanges and bindings endpoints) accepts a node JSON field. The value goes through rabbitnodes:make → listtoatom with no cluster membership check first. Each unique value permanently leaks one atom. A March 2026 refactoring (ea61ce2563) introduced safe helpers in rabbitmgmtnodes.erl (parsenodename, safeatom, and requirenodename, using binarytoexistingatom) and fixed several callers (QQ replica ops, wmauthattempts, wmnodememoryets, getsortreverse, and rabbitfederationmgmt), but getnode/1 in rabbitmgmtutil.erl:880-885, the primary vector used by directrequest/6, was not Roughly 900K requests crash the VM via systemlimit, and all tenants lose Any user with the management tag and one vhost, the lowest privilege This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15 and 4.0.20 and 4.1.11 and 4.2.6.

400

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Draft

Abstraction: Class Structure: Simple

Common Consequences

Security Scopes Affected:

Availability Access Control Other

Potential Impacts:

Dos: Crash, Exit, Or Restart Dos: Resource Consumption (Cpu) Dos: Resource Consumption (Memory) Dos: Resource Consumption (Other) Bypass Protection Mechanism Other