CVE-2026-6720

Published: Mag 28, 2026 Last Modified: Mag 28, 2026

ExploitDB:

Other exploit source:

Google Dorks:

HIGH 7,2

Source: [email protected]

Attack Vector: network

Attack Complexity: low

Privileges Required: low

User Interaction: passive

Confidentiality: N/A

Integrity: N/A

Availability: N/A

Description

AI Translation Available

When calicoctl is invoked with --log-level=info or --log-level=debug, the client prints the full contents of its loaded connection-configuration struct to stderr in a single log line. The struct embeds every credential calicoctl uses to talk to the cluster — inline kubeconfig (with bearer token), Kubernetes API bearer token, etcd password, and inline PEM-encoded etcd client certificate and key. Any reader of that stderr stream — CI job logs, session-recording archives, shared support-ticket transcripts, or local filesystem viewers on the host that ran calicoctl — can extract these credentials with zero Kubernetes privilege. calicoctl's default log level is panic, so this issue only triggers when verbose logging is explicitly enabled.