CVE-2026-68189

Published: Ago 10, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 10, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_sync: Protect UUID list traversal

The hci_sync conversion moved class-of-device and EIR generation from an
HCI request built under hdev->lock to asynchronous command sync work.
The worker holds hdev->req_lock, but that lock does not serialize access
to hdev->uuids against add_uuid() and remove_uuid(), which update the
list under hdev->lock.

The following interleaving can therefore occur:

CPU0 (command sync work) CPU1 (management socket)
fetch uuid from the list
list_del(&uuid->list)
kfree(uuid)
read uuid->size

KASAN reports the resulting use-after-free:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810dbd8620 by task kworker/u17:0/87
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
eir_create+0xb8f/0xee0
hci_update_eir_sync+0x1c0/0x330
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x13c/0x290
process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10

Allocated by task 86:
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
add_uuid+0x18a/0x4b0
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0

Freed by task 92:
__kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
remove_uuid+0x25e/0x560
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x1033/0x1ea0

Hold hdev->lock while generating and committing the class-of-device and
EIR snapshots. Release it before sending an HCI command, so controller
waits do not happen under the device lock. This protects all UUID list
walks in these paths and restores the serialization lost in the command
sync conversion.

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a351f68fb24828b23a971e00b8238ee0e8a40380
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a42f5536ea9c00e13f0c0fbb330feed95e2365ca
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4fa2c5c261d736b8e58759fdef3a968d510630c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9027ffbf5a0f3c12ca8900822e884eae9f0821b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe13adc258df88d95789e5673c7ba5178b5f8b28