CVE-2026-73567

Published: Ago 13, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 13, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
CRITICAL 9,1
Source: [email protected]
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: high
Availability: none

Description

AI Translation Available

sm-crypto provides JavaScript implementations of the Chinese cryptographic algorithms SM2, SM3, and SM4. Prior to 0.5.0, the default no-argument sm2.generateKeyPairHex() path in Node.js uses the module-wide SecureRandom instance in src/sm2/utils.js, supplied by [email protected], which seeds an ARC4 stream from Math.random() and new Date().getTime() because window.crypto.getRandomValues is unavailable even though globalThis.crypto exists. An attacker who can observe the process's Math.random() outputs and estimate the key-generation time can reconstruct the seed, recover generated SM2 private keys, and predict signing ephemeral scalars used to forge signatures. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0.

338

Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)

Draft
Abstraction: Base Structure: Simple
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Access Control
Potential Impacts:
Bypass Protection Mechanism
Applicable Platforms
All platforms may be affected
Likelihood of Exploit: Medium
View CWE Details
https://github.com/JuneAndGreen/sm-crypto/commit/1f9bd7bd16…
https://github.com/JuneAndGreen/sm-crypto/commit/1f9bd7bd160c24efd9c26c8f7fda99…
https://github.com/JuneAndGreen/sm-crypto/security/advisori…
https://github.com/JuneAndGreen/sm-crypto/security/advisories/GHSA-vh45-f885-38…