CVE-2026-74439

Published: Ago 15, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 15, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down scalable-mode context entry

device_pasid_table_teardown() zeroes the 128-bit scalable-mode context
entry with context_clear_entry() while the Present bit is still set. This
creates a window where the hardware can fetch a torn entry, with some
fields already zeroed while Present is still set, leading to unpredictable
behavior or spurious faults. The context-cache invalidation is issued only
after the entry has been zeroed, and intel_pasid_free_table() then frees
the PASID directory pages, so the IOMMU can keep walking a stale Present=1
entry that points at freed memory.

While x86 provides strong write ordering, the compiler may reorder the two
64-bit writes to the entry, and the hardware fetch is not guaranteed to be
atomic with respect to multiple CPU writes.

Commit c1e4f1dccbe9d ('iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down
context entry') fixed this exact pattern in domain_context_clear_one() and
the copied-context path, but device_pasid_table_teardown() was not
converted.

Align it with the 'Guidance to Software for Invalidations' in the VT-d
spec, Section 6.5.3.3, using the same ownership handshake as the sibling
fix: clear only the Present bit, flush it to the IOMMU, perform the
context-cache invalidation, and only then zero the rest of the entry.

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/588718101e8449605f1c7e858fecb7cfa701cdab
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fd4077dc92b91b1b844333c0a06bb9e286db10a
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9e83bcfe37dc719182500dd823c03ab57d934f0
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f46452c3df7a8d8a5addc0926e76ef19ea7da0a0