CVE-2026-74905

Published: Ago 18, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 18, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
MEDIUM 6,9
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Confidentiality: N/A
Integrity: N/A
Availability: N/A
HIGH 7,1
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: low
Availability: none

Description

AI Translation Available

SiYuan before v3.7.4 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the isPrivateIP function in kernel/util/net.go, used by SSRFSafeDialer to enforce SSRF protection in SafeMode. The function only checks for loopback, link-local unicast, private, and unspecified addresses and does not recognize IPv6 transition addresses (NAT64 64:ff9b::/96, 6to4 2002::/16, Teredo 2001::/32) that embed private IPv4 destinations. When SafeMode is enabled, an authenticated attacker can bypass the SSRF guard via the network forward proxy, WebSocket proxy, or SSE proxy endpoints by supplying a URL whose hostname resolves to such a transition address, reaching internal services and cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254). Because the forward proxy returns the full response body, this is a full-read SSRF that can be used to steal instance credentials, reach internal services, and port-scan internal infrastructure.

918

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control
Potential Impacts:
Read Application Data Execute Unauthorized Code Or Commands Bypass Protection Mechanism
Applicable Platforms
Technologies: Web Based, AI/ML, Web Server
View CWE Details
https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-qq8m-8p8v-x4xg
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-ssrf-via-ipv6-transition-add…