CVE-2026-79978

Published: Ott 23, 2026 Last Modified: Ott 23, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
LOW 3,6
Attack Vector: local
Attack Complexity: high
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: none
Integrity: low
Availability: low

Description

The RTIO streaming completion callback adxl345_process_fifo_samples_cb() in drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c clamps the amount of FIFO data it will report (read_len = MIN(fifo_bytes, buf_avail)) to the space actually returned by rtio_sqe_rx_buf(), but then queues one 6-byte bus read per hardware FIFO entry at consecutive offsets from read_buf, bounded by the device-reported entry count rather than by the clamp. When the allocated buffer is smaller than a full batch, the driver writes up to 186 bytes past the end of the allocation; a companion defect left data->fifo_total_bytes un-reset at batch start, so an aborted or errored chain could leave a stale write offset that pushes the next batch's writes out of bounds as well.

A short buffer is an expected, first-class outcome of the RTIO allocator: rtio_block_pool_alloc() walks the requested size down one block at a time until a contiguous run is available, and the driver only demands sizeof(struct adxl345_fifo_data) + 6 bytes as its minimum. Any streaming configuration whose mempool block granularity is smaller than a full FIFO batch (204 bytes) — for example the sensor shell's RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL(sensor_read_rtio, 8, 8, 32, 64, 4) used by sensor stream <dev> on fifo_wm incl, or the 16-byte-block streaming example in the documentation — takes this path whenever the pool is fragmented or the consuming thread falls behind.

The out-of-bounds writes are performed by the I2C/SPI RTIO backend (DMA on many SoCs) into the shared RTIO block pool, corrupting neighbouring live buffers or, for a pool smaller than one batch, memory beyond the pool itself. The written bytes are accelerometer samples and the destination follows the allocation, so there is no controllable corruption primitive: the realistic impact is silent corruption of other RTIO consumers' data or a crash. Reaching it requires a board with an interrupt-wired ADXL345 built with CONFIG_ADXL345_STREAM, plus buffer-pool starvation, which a co-resident local workload can induce but which also occurs spontaneously under load; there is no network, USB or radio path to this code.

787

Out-of-bounds Write

Draft
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Integrity Availability Other
Potential Impacts:
Modify Memory Execute Unauthorized Code Or Commands Dos: Crash, Exit, Or Restart Unexpected State
Applicable Platforms
Languages: Memory-Unsafe, C, C++, Assembly
Technologies: ICS/OT
View CWE Details
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3451bb1e1e9165844060551164a…
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-4v56-r4qm…