CVE-2026-80683

Published: Ago 28, 2026 Last Modified: Ago 29, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 8,8
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Attack Vector: adjacent_network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: high
Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: SCO: give the socket its own sco_conn reference

sco_conn_del() drops a reference it does not own. It takes one transient
reference via sco_conn_hold_unless_zero() and releases it with the
sco_conn_put() that follows sco_sock_hold(); the additional put in the
!sk branch releases a second one:

conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(conn);
...
sk = sco_sock_hold(conn);
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
sco_conn_put(conn);

if (!sk) {
sco_conn_put(conn);
return;
}

When close() races the controller's Disconnection Complete, sco_chan_del()
clears conn->sk and drops the socket's reference while sco_conn_del() is
running. sco_conn_del() then sees sk == NULL, its own put drops the count
to zero and frees the conn, and the second put writes to the freed kref:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190
Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881099dec74 by task kworker/u17:3/413
Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
sco_conn_put.part.0+0x1a/0x190
hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0
hci_event_packet+0x54a/0x650
hci_rx_work+0x321/0x3d0
Allocated by task 413:
sco_conn_add+0x72/0x1a0
sco_connect_cfm+0x88/0x670
Freed by task 413:
sco_conn_del.isra.0+0x3f/0xf0
hci_disconn_complete_evt+0x1ee/0x3e0
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.

The root cause is that the socket stores the connection without holding a
reference of its own. __sco_chan_add() does:

sco_pi(sk)->conn = conn;

so the socket borrows whatever reference its caller happened to hold, and
the callers paper over that with ad-hoc holds and puts. Give the socket a
counted reference instead: __sco_chan_add() takes one and it is released
together with the channel (sco_chan_del()) and in sco_sock_destruct().
With the socket holding its own reference, sco_conn_del() no longer needs
the extra put and the redundant hold in sco_conn_ready() goes away.

Making the socket own its reference means the connection is now actually
freed on the error paths of sco_connect() where it used to leak, which in
turn runs sco_conn_free() and its hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon). To keep the
hci_conn accounting balanced, make that ownership explicit as well:
sco_conn_add() consumes one hci_conn reference and the sco_conn owns it for
its lifetime. sco_connect() hands over the reference returned by
hci_connect_sco() and no longer drops it on the error paths;
sco_connect_cfm(), which is not given a reference, takes one with
hci_conn_hold() before handing it to sco_conn_add() (and drops it again if
the allocation fails); and the explicit hci_conn_hold() in sco_conn_ready()
is removed. Every reference then has a single, clear owner.

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System)

Trend Analysis

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System)

Prevede la probabilità di sfruttamento basata su intelligence sulle minacce e sulle caratteristiche della vulnerabilità.

EPSS Score
0,0017
Percentile
0,1th
Updated

Single Data Point

Only one EPSS measurement is available for this CVE. Trend analysis requires multiple data points over time.

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fe627192fa5da7157f9a48608f13c04b6373e43
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a33bc07b4730b6cd5681ac77d18ae0de3e739690
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abd93c85c8667add738ee82aeab95dd9fc8265a2