CVE-2026-84747

Published: Ott 21, 2026 Last Modified: Ott 21, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:

Description

AI Translation Available

Interpretation conflict in the HTTP protocol implementation in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to bypass access control rules enforced by a front proxy.

Root Cause:
The method dispatch function FindMethodPropertyByURI() in bRPC's HTTP protocol splits the request path with a string splitter that skips empty fields, so paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes), such as //flags, /flags// and /flags//port, are dispatched to the same method as their collapsed form /flags. Per RFC 3986 these are distinct paths. A front proxy that enforces an ACL (e.g. blocking access to builtin services such as /flags) matches the collapsed form only, and therefore forwards the padded literal to the bRPC server, where it is dispatched as if it were the collapsed form. This differential allows //flags?setvalue= to reach a builtin service that /flags is not allowed to reach. Additionally, the HTTP/2 implementation never validated the :path pseudo-header, so requests without a :path, or with a :path that neither begins with '/' nor is the asterisk-form '*', contrary to RFC 9113 section 8.3.1, were not rejected.

Affected Scenarios:
Deployments of Apache bRPC behind a front proxy or gateway that performs access control (ACL) decisions on the literal request path, where the bRPC server accepts HTTP or HTTP/2 traffic from that proxy. In such deployments an attacker can send a path containing empty path segments to reach a resource that the front proxy intended to block.

How to Fix:
(Choose one of the following options)
1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue.
2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3512

Note:
After applying the fix, HTTP and HTTP/2 request paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes) are rejected by default, and HTTP/2 :path values that are empty or neither begin with '/' nor equal '*' are rejected. Deployments that depend on the previous lenient behavior can restore it by turning on the gflag -http_allow_empty_path_segments, which is not recommended for servers exposed to untrusted traffic.

436

Interpretation Conflict

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Integrity Other
Potential Impacts:
Unexpected State Varies By Context
Applicable Platforms
All platforms may be affected
View CWE Details
https://lists.apache.org/thread/2pf15ojj0vr7rtx95677kgtl1mx3gdgb