CVE-2026-89819

Published: Set 16, 2026 Last Modified: Set 16, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 7,8
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Attack Vector: local
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: high
Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: validate plane degamma LUT size for private color prop

Unlike the CRTC degamma path, which is guarded by
amdgpu_dm_verify_lut_sizes(), the per-plane degamma LUT size was never
validated before use. __set_dm_plane_degamma() passed the user-supplied
size straight into __is_lut_linear() and, for a non-linear LUT, into
__set_input_tf() -> __drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(), the latter always iterating
MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES entries regardless of the actual LUT size.

A malformed AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT blob (e.g. a single entry) could thus
trigger a divide-by-zero in __is_lut_linear() or an out-of-bounds read in
__drm_lut_to_dc_gamma(). Reject any plane degamma LUT whose size does not
match MAX_COLOR_LUT_ENTRIES, mirroring the invariant the code already
asserts a few lines below (and which the CRTC path enforces).

The AMD_PLANE_DEGAMMA_LUT property is only exposed on builds with
AMD_PRIVATE_COLOR defined.

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b2615b8b54f58bbdf986dffb38cbc35214a5cc5
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b10cc09b329245c6d95f8fa3e7f068575e3e0e9f
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4c3ab59021e7c146a84b6671f0d530972bd58b4
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6f04d8ae5725bcc893bdc62e3467efd97255c5b