CVE-2026-89968

Published: Set 16, 2026 Last Modified: Set 16, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 7,5
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: none
Integrity: none
Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet-tcp: reject unsolicited H2CData PDUs

nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu() accepts an H2CData PDU after only checking
that its TTAG is a valid in-range command index and that the command's
data buffers are mapped. It never checks that the target has actually
solicited that data by sending an R2T for the command.

A remote host can abuse this. It submits a write command that takes the
R2T path and, before the target transmits the R2T, sends an H2CData PDU
for that command's tag. The data completes the command early, and when
the command then fails synchronously (e.g. a length mismatch caught by
nvmet_check_transfer_len()), it is completed a second time. Each
completion calls nvmet_tcp_queue_response(), so the same command is added
to queue->resp_list twice while it is still linked; the second llist_add()
makes the node point to itself (lentry->next == lentry).

nvmet_tcp_process_resp_list() then walks that self-referential node and
adds the command to resp_send_list twice. With CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST this
trips the 'list_add double add' check (kernel BUG); without it the loop
never terminates and the nvmet_tcp workqueue wedges (soft-lockup). It is
remotely triggerable and needs no authentication on an allow_any_host
subsystem.

Track whether an R2T has been transmitted for a command and reject an
H2CData PDU that arrives before it. The flag is cleared on command reuse
(nvmet_tcp_get_cmd() zeroes cmd->flags) and stays set across the multiple
H2CData PDUs of a single solicited transfer.

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02341ee424fb2eed16b5b8a9d247492e49335c21
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14beef7d4f123fb458fc9844aa74a071871dcca6
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cbed7538946c99e585acefd11c9ba3a0bdbae05
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b71f9193e3d3a352920ba367f1a6db345249038
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fb527103e53fd43a8e802c2eca407869c204f7a
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cade124c06f8e738e3a0df285ed2e08953e6bfaa
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf1484d9a75de6809ef331e16f525aaa41b0e16d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db62b35cbca052860c519cbcabe7650708528738