CVE-2026-90044

Published: Set 16, 2026 Last Modified: Set 16, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
HIGH 7,8
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Attack Vector: local
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: low
User Interaction: none
Scope: unchanged
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: high
Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix Use-After-Free in AIO error path

In ffs_epfile_write_iter() and ffs_epfile_read_iter(), when ffs_epfile_io()
fails with an error other than -EIOCBQUEUED, the io_data structure (`p`) is
freed. However, for AIO operations, the kiocb cancel function was already
armed and kiocb->private was set to `p`.

If a concurrent cancel operation (such as sys_io_cancel()) executes after
ffs_epfile_io() fails but before the function frees `p`, a Use-After-Free
can occur when the cancellation handler accesses the freed pointer.

To securely fix this race condition, we must properly un-arm the
cancellation. Invoking `kiocb->ki_complete()` does exactly this by
acquiring `ctx->ctx_lock` and safely removing the kiocb from the active
sequence. In doing so, it ensures that a parallel io_cancel can no longer
discover the kiocb, effectively closing the race window.

We then return -EIOCBQUEUED to notify the VFS layer that the kiocb has been
consumed and it should avoid attempting to complete the request again or
triggering subsequent completion handlers.

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/153b5ecd29ed055562400bc17c91df3fd869b0ce
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a2fb2d12b87b43724230abb52a1440617c7b6cc
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e78dcb1f7ec271449c54984dc90c62a5ba272de7