CVE-2026-91085

Published: Set 29, 2026 Last Modified: Set 29, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:

Description

AI Translation Available

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.

The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role.

config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.

Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.

By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.

MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

862

Missing Authorization

Incomplete
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Confidentiality Integrity Access Control Availability
Potential Impacts:
Read Application Data Read Files Or Directories Modify Application Data Modify Files Or Directories Gain Privileges Or Assume Identity Bypass Protection Mechanism Dos: Crash, Exit, Or Restart Dos: Resource Consumption (Cpu) Dos: Resource Consumption (Memory) Dos: Resource Consumption (Other)
Applicable Platforms
Technologies: AI/ML, Web Server, Database Server, Not Technology-Specific
View CWE Details
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10
https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt