CVE-2026-92595

Published: Set 17, 2026 Last Modified: Set 19, 2026

ExploitDB:

Other exploit source:

Google Dorks:

MEDIUM 6,0

Source: [email protected]

Attack Vector: network

Attack Complexity: high

Privileges Required: low

User Interaction: none

Confidentiality: N/A

Integrity: N/A

Availability: N/A

MEDIUM 5,9

Source: [email protected]

Attack Vector: network

Attack Complexity: high

Privileges Required: low

User Interaction: none

Scope: unchanged

Confidentiality: high

Integrity: low

Availability: none

Description

AI Translation Available

Nodemailer (npm package `nodemailer`) versions 9.1.0 and earlier do not honor the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` sandbox options when message content is resolved through the public plugin API `MailMessage.resolveContent()` using the documented legacy three-argument signature `resolveContent(data, key, callback)`. Because `shared.resolveContent()` normalizes the missing `options` argument to an empty object, the message-level flags copied into `mail.data` by the MailMessage constructor are discarded, and `resolveContentValue()` skips both access-control checks, reaching `nmfetch(url)` or `fs.createReadStream(path)`. As a result, plugin or application code that resolves untrusted message content (html, text, attachment `path` or `href`) via this API can be induced to read arbitrary local files or issue outbound HTTP(S) requests (server-side request forgery), bypassing the sandbox the application enabled. The internal paths used by `transporter.sendMail()` (`resolveAll()`, `_convertDataImages()`, and the MIME streaming path) are not affected. Fixed in version 9.1.1.

External Control of File Name or Path

Draft

Abstraction: Base Structure: Simple

Common Consequences

Security Scopes Affected:

Integrity Confidentiality Availability

Potential Impacts:

Read Files Or Directories Modify Files Or Directories Execute Unauthorized Code Or Commands Dos: Crash, Exit, Or Restart Dos: Resource Consumption (Other)