CVE-2026-93606

Published: Set 18, 2026 Last Modified: Set 18, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:
CRITICAL 10,0
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Confidentiality: N/A
Integrity: N/A
Availability: N/A
CRITICAL 10,0
Attack Vector: network
Attack Complexity: low
Privileges Required: none
User Interaction: none
Scope: changed
Confidentiality: high
Integrity: high
Availability: high

Description

AI Translation Available

vm2 (npm) versions 3.12.0 and earlier contain a sandbox escape in `VM` and `NodeVM`. When an embedder exposes a host API that returns a host-realm Promise, the bridge's rejection sanitizer (hostPromiseSanitizeReject / makeSanitizedPromiseCallback / normalizeHostPromiseCallbacks in lib/bridge.js) only wraps `then`/`catch` rejection slots that hold a function, and the sandbox-side `Symbol.species`/`.then` neutralization is installed only on the sandbox intrinsic `Promise.prototype`, so it never applies to a host Promise. Code running inside the sandbox can overwrite `p.constructor[Symbol.species]` on the host Promise and then call `p.then()` with no `onRejected` handler; V8 substitutes its internal Thrower, which re-throws the raw host rejection value into a resolve/reject closure captured by the attacker. This delivers an unsanitized, fully functional bridge proxy of the host object to sandboxed code, bypassing handleException and hostPromiseSanitizeReject. If the rejection value is host-pivotable (for example a host `process` object), this results in arbitrary code execution on the host. Fixed in 3.12.1.

693

Protection Mechanism Failure

Draft
Common Consequences
Security Scopes Affected:
Access Control
Potential Impacts:
Bypass Protection Mechanism
Applicable Platforms
Technologies: Not Technology-Specific, ICS/OT
View CWE Details
https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-6454-5x88-m6jw
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.12.1-sandbox-escape-via-promi…