CVE-2026-98990

Published: Ott 23, 2026 Last Modified: Ott 23, 2026
ExploitDB:
Other exploit source:
Google Dorks:

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

namespace: check a submount for references right before unmounting it

shrink_submounts() and mark_mounts_for_expiry() first collect all the
mounts they are allowed to unmount and then unmount them.

Whether a mount is busy is decided by propagate_mount_busy() on the
tree. But unmounting the first mount changes the tree that the second
one propagates into. propagate_umount()
moves a surviving overmount off a copy it unmounts and mounts it where
the copy was mounted. If that's where the propagated copy of the second
victim is looked up the overmount becomes a candidate of the second
umount_tree(). It's childless and so trim_one() commits it without
looking at its reference count.

So a synchronous umount pulls out a busy mount that is in use somewhere
else and marks it MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT while it has users:

umount2(/tmp/plshrink/p1, 0) = 0 errno 0
cwd is (unreachable)

The same two umounts requested one after the other fail with EBUSY.
This needs a mount with MNT_SHRINKABLE, i.e., automounted submounts of
NFS, AFS and CIFS or the tracefs mount below debugfs. Bind mounts
inherit the flag.

Check each mount right before it is unmounted under the same hold of
namespace_sem and mount_lock as the umount itself. Make sure that the
algorithm stays linear.

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18902a23ef36f83d32bafc58ae2484e6bb4bb8ef
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32bf92416614a1e3ff3524fc6b780259c7aad3ef
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e4012e571867868b545c91ca9d6095fdb709907
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d73f04e92c1aab78d96ac6cadb234c8a3a373d22
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6394281834492c6516a405a348b545ae698a331